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THE PRIORITY OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
IN EARLY NEO-KANTIANISM
Kevin J. Harrelson
Abstract: This essay examines the argumentative context in which 
early Neo-Kantian philosophers defined and defended “epistemol-
ogy.” The paper defends Richard Rorty’s claim that the priority 
of epistemology influenced how the history of modern philosophy 
was written but corrects his story by showing that epistemology 
was defended mainly via antifoundational arguments. The essay 
begins with a few programmatic arguments by Kuno Fischer and 
Eduard Zeller but focuses mainly on Otto Liebmann’s Kant und 
die Epigonen. I argue that Liebmann completes the agenda of 
Fischer and Zeller by giving a detailed account of how a meta-
physical system is impossible for anyone who begins with modest, 
Kantian epistemological principles.
Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is notable for, among many other things, the attention that it pays to the demar-
cation of philosophical subfields.1 In his third chapter, “The Idea of a 
‘Theory of Knowledge,’” Rorty argued that epistemology in particular 
is of recent vintage. He located its rise among Kant’s followers in 
nineteenth-century Germany, and he claimed that only after this pe-
riod did philosophers and historians project epistemological questions 
back upon early modernity and antiquity (PMN, 132). The intent of this 
argument was to establish that our academic divisions are optional, so 
that current notions of philosophy would appear questionable (ibid.). 
These rather lofty argumentative goals met with mixed reaction, forc-
ing Rorty later to withdraw his attempts at presenting an intellectual 
history as a challenge to our disciplinary self-understanding.2 But the 
withdrawal of Rorty’s more ambitious aims nonetheless leaves a number 
of historical questions open. The present essay seeks to recover some of 
the historical theses on which he relied and to separate them from the 
admittedly exaggerated conclusions that he drew.
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 Of specific interest is the still underresearched question of how the 
early Neo-Kantian philosophers defined epistemology and justified it 
as the first philosophical science. Rorty’s approach to this issue suffered 
from an uneasy mixture of philosophical and institutional considerations. 
While it is probably true that a perceived need to isolate philosophy “from 
ideology on the one hand and from the rising empirical science on the 
other” (PMN, 134) provided philosophers with a reason to demarcate, 
for instance, epistemology from metaphysics and psychology, this tells 
us little about the argumentative reasons for the move. Other scholars 
of Neo-Kantianism, such as Klaus Christian Köhnke, have followed 
Rorty in his emphasis on institutional analysis.3 As a result they have 
underplayed some of the arguments, and, in Rorty’s case, this occasioned 
a crucial mischaracterization of the Neo-Kantian defense of epistemol-
ogy. Rorty zealously attacked both epistemology and foundationalism, 
and, in doing so, he conflated two things that were importantly distin-
guished in the nineteenth century. Philosophers in the 1860s, in fact, 
defended epistemology with explicitly antifoundationalist arguments, 
ones that curiously resemble moves from Rorty’s own playbook. Much 
of his subsequent characterization of nineteenth-century epistemology 
was, then, misguided.4
 In this essay, I recount the development of some programmatic, an-
tifoundational arguments that were popular in Germany between the 
years of 1860 and 1865, in the interest of arguing that epistemology was 
established as the prima philosophia precisely because of the impos-
sibility of a foundational or “systematic” philosophy. I trace the origin 
of epistemology as a distinct field of study to Kuno Fischer’s writings on 
Kant. In the first section, I argue that Fischer provided the framework 
for Eduard Zeller’s more famous account of epistemology’s independence. 
In the second section, I explain how the theses of Fischer and Zeller were 
supported by some misguided historical and philological developments. 
This part of my essay vindicates Rorty’s analysis somewhat, since it 
reveals how key portions of the popular narrative of modern philosophy 
rest on theses about the scope and nature of philosophy. In the third 
and fourth sections, I turn to Otto Liebmann’s Kant und die Epigonen 
in order to show how the programmatic arguments of Fischer and Zeller 
were strengthened by explicitly antifoundational considerations. My 
focus will be on Liebmann’s correlation argument, which I take to be 
worthy of further attention.
THE PROGRAMMATIC ARGUMENT
One obstacle to an adequate history of this period, which Rorty rightly 
noticed, has been that we do not well understand the relationship be-
tween the received history of modern philosophy and the philosophical 
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interests of nineteenth-century historians of philosophy. In this section, I 
aim to correct this problem somewhat by examining some arguments by 
that century’s two most prolific historians of philosophy, Eduard Zeller 
and Kuno Fischer.5 The arguments on which I will focus reveal that 
these philosophers rejected Hegelianism and instead laid the ground-
work for the “Back to Kant” movement.6 Fischer and Zeller defended 
epistemology with a mixture of programmatic argument and general 
historiography, the former being initially accompanied by large-scale at-
tempts to construct a history of modern philosophy on a Kantian model. 
The common characterization of Zeller and Fischer as Hegelians, then, 
obscures an important development in nineteenth-century philosophy. 
I follow Andrew Chignell in labeling Fischer and Zeller instead as Neo-
Kantians, and I explain how their arguments in epistemology framed 
their construction of a modern canon.
 Fischer’s many writings on Kant include a concise programmatic argu-
ment that he proposed most clearly in his 1860 lecture “On Epistemology 
as First Philosophy,” which appeared in a volume called Kants Leben und 
die Grundlagen seiner Lehre (Kant’s life and the principles of his doctrine).7 
The text departs from the premise that sciences are distinguished by their 
respective objects and concludes that a clearly defined and really existing 
object is a necessary condition for any valid science (Kants Leben, 80ff). 
A threat thus faces philosophy: if there could be an exact science of every 
existing object, then our Socratic pursuit of wisdom would be “a science 
without a home, or perhaps only with an imaginary one” (ibid., 81). The 
escape route lies in the fact that all sciences presuppose that there is 
knowledge, so that philosophy can survive as Erkenntnistheorie. Rather 
than being threatened in relation to the sciences, philosophy asserted 
as its object the one thing (“Erkenntnis”) that is a necessary condition 
for any science whatsoever. Epistemology thus names a definite object, 
namely, “knowledge,” for philosophy considered as a science, as opposed 
to such less easily defined objects as “the absolute.”
 The question of epistemology’s independence was already familiar 
as a special problem of Kantian interpretation, and Fischer’s decision 
in regard to it motivated a new conception of the history of nineteenth-
century philosophy. Simply put, the need to defend epistemology as an 
independent endeavor required a rejection of the methods pursued by 
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—it also required a link between the Kan-
tian notion of Vernunftkritik and the new concept of Erkenntnislehre.8 
Fischer therefore outlined a new history of Kantianism, ultimately 
paving the way for his mentee Otto Liebmann.9 One text that presents 
these problems plainly is Fischer’s 1862 Jena inaugural lecture on “The 
Two Kantian Schools in Jena.”10 A Kantian, according to this lecture, 
faces a plain dilemma. The Kantian can either practice Vernunftkritik, or 
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criticism in the absence of a system, or attempt to complement criticism 
with a new system of philosophy. The history of Kantianism, on this new 
retrospective view, divides cleanly into two corresponding schools, with 
everything hinging on how one understands the concepts of “criticism” 
and “system” (Fischer, Akademische Reden, 90).
 This historical dichotomy between criticism and system left the 
programmatic question in the background but brought to the fore an 
otherwise unarticulated need for a rejection of systematic philosophy. The 
central issue in rescuing philosophy as a science was to secure its object 
by distinction from the objects of the special sciences, not to establish 
limits on the form or scope of the discipline. But the received history 
of Post-Kantianism, which led to Hegel through Reinhold and Fichte, 
emphasized that the way to solve epistemological problems was to place 
them within a comprehensive philosophical system.11 Systematicity, 
then, was seen as a threat to the independence of epistemology, and so 
eo ipso to the dignity of philosophy. Fischer’s response was to place all 
those philosophers whom we now call “Post-Kantians” on one horn of 
a dilemma and, in so doing, to prepare the way for their removal from 
the history of Kantianism:
From a Kantian view these philosophers—despite both the diver-
sity of their systems and the intensity with which they fought each 
other—stand together as a group. They are all dominated by one basic 
thought, according to which they understand and develop Kantian 
philosophy. Reinhold embarked on a direction of speculative thought, 
which moved through its metamorphoses in the Wissenschaftslehre 
and Naturphilosophie and then finally reached its goal in Hegel. 
(Fischer, Akademische Reden, 84)
The other horn of the dilemma was followed by those who appropri-
ated Vernunftkritik in the absence of a system. A relatively unimposing 
figure in Jakob Fries served as the historical precedent for this move, 
and Fischer regarded Fries’s school as “the newer” as opposed to “older 
Kantian school” (ibid., 86). This last move sharpened the rhetoric fur-
ther against the Hegelian tradition: not only did Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel confine themselves to one position within Kantianism, but they 
also represented the older and less current of the two traditions. The 
symbolic context of the lecture only strengthens the point since Fichte 
and Schelling were announced thereby as outdated even at their own 
university. The appeal to Fries, on the other hand, was merely rhetorical. 
The latter’s anthropology of pure reason was no more acceptable than 
was Hegelianism, though it was less threatening (ibid., 99). Fischer’s 
text is, nonetheless, clear in its suggestion that criticism, now defined 
by him as Erkenntnislehre, will have to take seriously this possibility 
of eschewing systematic philosophy in order to focus only on knowledge 
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and that this requires a specifically anti-Hegelian history of modern 
philosophy (see ibid., 98–101).
 If Fischer’s aborted appeal to Fries was idiosyncratic even within his 
own body of work—after all, he later authored major tomes on Fichte 
and Hegel, not on Fries12—this does not mean that the rhetorical strat-
egy was without success. “The Two Kantian Schools in Jena” outlined 
the agenda for a new history of German philosophy: it must distinguish 
criticism from system and, in doing so, portray Reinhold, Fichte, Hegel, 
and other “Post-Kantian” philosophers as choosing the wrong path. A 
similarly ambitious combination of programmatic argument with general 
historiography appears in contemporaneous texts by Zeller, including his 
“On the Significance and Task of Epistemology.”13 This very influential 
lecture, delivered contemporaneously with Fischer’s address, elaborated 
some consequences of the newly conceived relation of philosophy to the 
sciences. Since the former consists in an investigation of knowledge as this 
appears in various endeavors including physics and psychology, philosophy 
qua epistemology plays a regulative or surveillance role among the sci-
ences (Vortraege und Abhandlungen, 483). The famous lecture, however, 
likewise proceeds on the premise that epistemology is incompatible with 
systematicity, without providing sufficient argument for the point. Zeller 
suggests only that the concept of a science requires a distinct, isolatable 
object, so that an approach like the one found in Hegel’s Logic is incom-
patible with the autonomy of scientific disciplines (ibid., 480–82).
 The “Return to Kant” with which this program concluded was, thus, 
also a return to a certain minimalist, epistemological Kant. The impera-
tive of Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling, namely that Kant’s philosophy 
needed completion in a unified system, was shunned in favor of a spe-
cifically “critical” Kant. What was needed philosophically was, then, a 
definition of “criticism” as an epistemology that resisted development 
into a philosophy like Schelling’s or Hegel’s. Philologically, the task was 
made somewhat easier given the fact that philosophers of the period 
studied only a portion of what we now consider to be the Kantian corpus. 
To give just one example, it was not until much later that philosophers 
became aware of the Opus postumum, and this text was widely viewed 
as a threat to the early Neo-Kantian Kant.14 In the next section, I outline 
how another, more influential philological dispute framed the debate 
over the definition of criticism.
EARLY KANT SCHOLARSHIP IN RELATION  
TO POST-KANTIANISM
In the last section, I concluded that the desiderata of the programmatic 
arguments by Fischer and Zeller included a minimalist reading of Kant 
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as well as a more convincing explanation of how and why his successors 
followed false paths. Kant scholarship and the general historiography of 
philosophy became, on this point, inseparable pursuits. More importantly, 
both the special and general problems in the history of philosophy were 
guided by more general arguments about the priority of epistemology. In 
this section, I wish to illustrate how a contingent fact of textual history 
aided the minimalist interpretation of Kant that these philosophers 
needed. Of particular concern is the dilemma that Kant’s two distinct 
versions of the “Transcendental Deduction” pose to the interpreter. The 
simple thesis of the early Neo-Kantians will perhaps seem surprising to 
some modern readers: the early industry of Kant scholarship was built 
on the premise that the entire second edition (1787) of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, and most especially what we call the “B Deduction,” is a 
corrupt text that cannot belong to an appropriately streamlined Kantian 
philosophy. Although later philosophers in the nineteenth century did 
sometimes express a preference for the B Deduction, the impact of the 
early Neo-Kantians should not be underestimated on this point. Even 
Dieter Henrich’s now classic essay on the B Deduction stressed that 
then-recent emphasis on this text worked against the main current of 
the history of Kantianism.15
 A philological hypothesis convenient to Neo-Kantianism lay in a se-
ries of good-faith assertions by Arthur Schopenhauer, who inadvertently 
inspired an industry of Kantianism qua Vernunftkritik. The first edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason, as it happened, had been out of print and 
in rare circulation between the 1780s and its reappearance in 1838. In 
1844, Schopenhauer published his Critique of the Kantian Philosophy, 
which was appended to the second edition of his World as Will and Rep-
resentation. The latter text had appeared a quarter of a century earlier; 
in it, Schopenhauer claimed only a minimal allegiance to Kant. But he 
announced in the 1844 additions that the publication of Rosenkranz’s 
edition (in 1838) had altered his view of that philosopher—the other-
wise unknown first edition having presented a more acceptable line of 
argument.16 There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his confession, 
but the effects of his view are another matter. Beginning with Fischer’s 
1854 volume on the Critique, younger historians (including Überweg, 
von Hartmann, and initially Vaihinger) began to follow Schopenhauer in 
his rejection of the second edition.17 This presented them with a strategy 
for claiming an advantage over those Post-Kantians who argued that 
criticism or epistemology required justification in a philosophical sys-
tem: the latter had relied exclusively on the faulty second edition of the 
Critique. Many in the new generation then culled the first edition for 
passages with which they could attack the so-called identity philosophers 
such as Fichte and Hegel. The scholarly movement in question came to 
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an abrupt end in the middle 1880s, so that the program I review here 
lasted roughly thirty years.18
 Schopenhauer added to his observation a psychological explanation 
of the difference between the editions: an oversensitive Kant, discour-
aged by undesired comparisons to Berkeley, wrote the second edition in 
a sort of embittered forgetfulness of his authentically idealist philoso-
phy.19 In the new edition, Kant then included a series of revisions and 
modifications such as the revised Preface, an alternative version of the 
Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and a slew of 
additional references to the thing-in-itself. These texts, however, were 
supposed by Schopenhauer to be contradictory to the spirit of the first 
edition. Schopenhauer’s expression of these points contains his charac-
teristic vigor:
The entire section (A 348–92) in which Kant so beautifully and clearly 
presents his decisive idealism, was suppressed in the second edition. 
Kant replaced these passages with a series of contradictory proclama-
tions. As a result the text Critique of Pure Reason as this circulated 
from 1787 until 1838 was butchered and spoiled. It was a book full of 
contradictions, whose meaning no one could have understood clearly. 
(Die Welt als Wille, 555)
The convenient edition-hypothesis inspired both broad historical argu-
ments and particular philological tasks, both of which Schopenhauer 
outlined in their rudiments. His abbreviated history was indeed a meager 
bit of ad hominem speculation, since he insisted that Kant overreacted to 
the reception of his Critique between 1781 and 1787 (ibid., 557). But this 
speculation became a research hypothesis, which was pursued in several 
works by Fischer’s disciples.20 In the 1860s and ’70s, a number of notable 
figures attempted to narrate Kant’s career as having regressed after 
1781, although as a particular aim of interpretation it did not meet with 
tremendous success.21 To the biographical narratives there corresponded 
some philological tasks that were suggested by the differences between 
the two editions, and the purpose of these was to delegitimize those texts 
added to the second edition. The two most prominent were—predictably 
given Fischer’s agenda—the difference between the Deductions and the 
notion of a thing-in-itself.22 Even in the English-speaking world, where 
the stakes were not well understood, these matters became the concern 
of early practitioners of the academic history of philosophy.23
 Not only did Schopenhauer place a wedge between Kant and his im-
mediate successors, making it easier to portray the Post-Kantians as 
divergent from the master, but he also renewed interest in the relation-
ships between Kant and his predecessors. Schopenhauer accepted the 
association with Berkeley, which was unthinkable for the Hegelians (see 
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Die Welt als Wille, 535, 555). It later became a more important task for 
scholars to portray in a somewhat positive light the relationship between, 
for instance, Kant and Locke or Leibniz, namely, those philosophers who 
have since come to be called either “Pre-Critical” or “Pre-Kantians.” Es-
tablishing Kant as a synthesizer of the modern schools of epistemology 
was the early occupation of Kuno Fischer as well as many philosophers 
who worked in the subsequent three decades.24 The various relationships 
among Kant’s predecessors on the origin and justification of knowledge 
became the subject matter that these philosophers called “modern 
philosophy,” with their influential historiographical categories such as 
“rationalism,” “empiricism,” and so forth. Philosophers after Kant were 
excluded from the picture on the premise that, by accident of publication 
history, they had no access to the real Kant.
 Schopenhauer’s ad hominem speculation was thus the inspiration 
for a widespread historical and philological agenda. While Fischer 
and his students were not followers of Schopenhauer on substantive 
matters, their attachment to him on this point is undeniable. As late 
as 1883, we find Fischer defending the irreconcilability of the two edi-
tions in the same sense in which Schopenhauer asserts it, and he even 
uses the same quotations from the first edition to establish his point.25 
Among the many young scholars who participated in this debate was 
Friedrich Überweg, whose subsequent textbook on modern philosophy 
was especially influential. Überweg wrote his dissertation on the edition 
controversy in 1861, not long before publishing Grundriss der Geschichte 
der Philosophie (Outlines of the history of philosophy).26 The writings of 
Überweg, Fischer, and others can be credited with developing the specific 
picture of Kant, along with its limited set of interpretive problems, that 
formed the basis for further dispute in the age when historical publica-
tions multiplied rapidly.27
 By the time Kuno Fischer published his last works on Kant, in the 
middle 1880s, philological discoveries had put the edition thesis (and 
with it the whole historical agenda) on the defensive.28 Kant’s develop-
ment was by then the subject of three decades of focused scholarship, so 
that blind conjectures such as Schopenhauer’s were no longer acceptable. 
A selection of nuanced biographical and philological accounts dismissed 
the old suggestion that Kant composed his later works in cowardly re-
treat or dogmatic forgetfulness.29 Although some scholars even surmised 
that Fischer’s Kant was too heavily influenced by the Post-Kantians, 
this supposition poses the problem backward.30 Schopenhauer’s thesis, 
as filtered through Fischer into minute scholarship, was rather the chief 
rhetorical method of defending the rejection of systematicity in favor 
of an isolated and independent Vernunftkritik. The historiographical 
offspring of Schopenhauer’s thesis perhaps reigned only in a brief era, 
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but it was an important era historically. Neo-Kantian textbooks in the 
history of philosophy were then on the rise, and, in these popular works, 
the historians sought a way to draw a sharper distinction between Kant 
and his epigones.31
LIEBMANN ON THE DISTINCTION  
BETWEEN CRITICISM AND SYSTEM
The edition controversy was only the philological manifestation of a 
philosophical task, and the eventual demise of the former is to be dis-
tinguished from the relative success of the latter. Kant did not, in the 
1780s, merely retreat in cowardice from a bit of public criticism, but 
there remains, nonetheless, a question of which aspects of his philosophy 
should be selected as of lasting value. Fischer’s philological program, I 
have argued, served the interest of demonstrating his new (but insuf-
ficiently defined) notion of Erkenntnislehre as consistent with the best 
interpretation of Kantian criticism. In this section, I argue that Otto 
Liebmann replaced the philological agenda with a substantive argu-
ment concluding that the principles of criticism are incompatible with 
any and every philosophical system. Liebmann thereby established the 
priority of epistemology on argumentative, as opposed to philological, 
grounds, and he did so with classically antifoundational weapons. To 
complete the argument, however, he needed a concept of criticism as 
an antifoundational epistemology without claiming to have found it in 
Kant’s own text. He did this by supplementing what he took to be Kan-
tian doctrine with two important ideas, what I will call his correlation 
argument and his continuity thesis.
 Liebmann began by proclaiming the entire philological enterprise 
to be dangerously misleading. Dispute over the editions, he reasoned, 
runs the danger of presenting the most important philosophical matters 
as if they rest on historical contingencies. Undue emphasis on textual 
differences likewise overlooks the fact that whatever errors Kant made 
in the second edition were implicit in the 1781 text (Liebmann, Kant 
und die Epigonen, 26). Textual study in the history of philosophy was 
in this instance not only a premise in a larger argument, but it was also 
a dispensable premise. The strategy of Liebmann’s 1865 treatise Kant 
und die Epigonen, in fact, makes both the programmatic argument 
and the general historiographical picture more convincing precisely by 
freeing them from philological disputes. This important text has been 
overlooked by scholars who have been too eager to look for what could 
be considered accurate portrayals of Kant, when Liebmann’s allegiance 
was to an argument rather than to a late Prussian professor.32 The Neo-
Kantians generally were aware of what they sought in Kant, and Otto 
Liebmann retrospectively decided what counts as authentic criticism. 
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He then accepted as authentic only those texts that supported his view. 
Any troubling passages by Kant about things-in-themselves or forthcom-
ing systems, in this context, provided evidence only against a particular 
individual named Immanuel Kant, not against Kantian criticism qua 
epistemology as defined in 1865.
 Liebmann’s aggressively reconstructive history needed to preserve 
and defend the basic Neo-Kantian distinction between the critical and 
the dogmatic Kant, which is to say between epistemology and meta-
physics. Liebmann offered a precise conceptual distinction between 
the “principal doctrine” and the “principal error” of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, but without appeal to the indecisiveness of its author. The sole 
doctrine that comprises critical philosophy, on Liebmann’s view, is the 
apriority of the categories and space-time. After discovering this “prin-
cipal doctrine,” the argument runs, Kant made the Hauptfehler of trying 
to explain it in terms of so-called things-in-themselves. The task of the 
new epistemology was, thus, to rescue apriority while resisting any such 
ultimate explanation for the principle. The ingenious strategy of Kant 
und die Epigonen is to construct an argument that apriority implies the 
impossibility of any final explanations in philosophy, with the additional 
claim that all previous philosophers—including Kant—had missed this 
implication.
 To achieve this end, Liebmann needed also to explain the slip from 
criticism to dogmatism, showing how anyone might lapse from a fleeting 
critical insight back into dogmatic metaphysics. He argued not that Kant 
in particular forgot his best insight, but rather that inquirers as such are 
disposed to do so. This point detached the argument from the contest for 
Immanuel Kant’s literal meaning, while at the same time it solidified 
the Kantian canon by the further exclusion of all subsequent charac-
ters. This framework inspired a reluctant vilification by Liebmann of 
Fichte in particular, who was thought to have led the nineteenth-century 
downfall of criticism by pursuing only the Hauptfehler at the expense 
of authentic criticism. The strategy is rather straightforward: the living 
and the dead in Kant being clearly delineated, one needs only to show 
that it was the mistakes, rather than the critical insights, that served as 
inspiration for Fichte and (eo ipso) the other epigones. A minimal Kant 
and the mistaken Fichte are, in this context, self-conscious constructs 
of an abstract argument, since they name positions or tendencies more 
so than they do historical personages.
 Despite the reduced emphasis on textual argument, Liebmann’s ac-
tual position leans heavily on Fischer’s rejection of the second edition. 
The minimal lesson that Liebmann gleans from Kant’s philosophy is 
simply that our understanding has definite limits and that the task 
of an epistemologist is to seek and destroy any transgressions of the 
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boundaries in question. This streamlined Kantianism accepts only the 
apriority of time, space, and the categories, factors that condition all 
scientific cognition. Most of Kant’s writings after the “Transcendental 
Aesthetic” were still seen as unjust extensions of the critical principle, 
and Liebmann offered an argumentative (as opposed to a textual) rejec-
tion of them. The notion of a thing-in-itself came again under scrutiny, 
representing not merely an exemplary transgression but rather a kind 
of dogmatism an sich (Kant und die Epigonen, 27). Along with the con-
troversy over the deductions, this doctrine had formed the heart of the 
philological controversies, so that Liebmann needed to replace both with 
more minimal Kantian arguments.
 The Ding an sich is, in this context, a methodological problem more 
than a metaphysical or logical one. It is a matter of what kinds of ex-
planations philosophy should seek, not a matter of whether anything 
is independent of minds. Only a dogmatism that could access things as 
they are independently of the conditions of experience—things in them-
selves—could declare the middle-sized dry goods that we experience to 
be “appearances,” so that the opposition between things and appearances 
needed to be rejected:
Even if the spatio-temporal world were only an “appearance,” it would 
not be such for the intellect. The reason for this is that the intellect is 
unable to compare the spatio-temporal world with anything else. The 
world in space in time is everything to the intellect, and so that world 
cannot justly be called an “appearance.” (Kant und die Epigonen, 27).
A new theory was needed to replace this distinction, and Liebmann 
purported to discover this by means of his correlation argument. This 
argument states that the terms “subject” and “object” denote correlative 
concepts, ones that have no place in the absence of each other (ibid., 41ff). 
As a result, there can be no question of an object’s existing without a 
subject, nor of explaining objects metaphysically in terms of subjects (or 
vice versa). These notions belong together like a mountain and a valley, 
an idea at which Kant aimed but missed with his notion of appearance. 
It is not hard to see how the many Post-Kantian efforts at explaining 
these concepts in terms of each other can be classified as “dogmatic.” Just 
as there is no meaningful question about whether mountains should be 
explained in terms of valleys or vice versa, so can there be no question of 
whether subjects should be explained in terms of objects or vice versa. 
The entire question of whether subjects or objects are prior, or between 
idealism and realism in metaphysics, is here explained as the result of 
a methodological shortcoming.
 Replacing the thing/appearance distinction with the correlate theory 
comprises the first move in the correction of Kant’s position and the 
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preservation of criticism at the expense of systematicity. It remains to 
be explained why the correlate theory is so elusive, a task Liebmann 
executes with his pair of deductions of the concept of a thing-in-itself. 
These purport to illustrate why and how someone who achieves a 
moment of critical insight might revert to dogmatism. Dogmatic meta-
physics, as Kant insists, rests in a basic tendency of the human intellect. 
If criticism is such a rarity, even among philosophers, then, we should 
not be surprised to learn that dogmatism is in some way pathological 
for humans. Liebmann’s achievement on this point rests in his having 
brought a description of our dogmatic pathology under the rubric of a 
general definition and history of philosophy. Here he differs in an impor-
tant respect from Fischer, conceding slightly more to a dogmatic sense of 
the task of philosophy: philosophy is the abstract representation of the 
world as a macrocosm and microcosm (Kant und die Epigonen, 33). In 
this, all past systems of philosophy have been in agreement, although 
the temptation to offer a complete picture of the world is fatal:
Despite their sharp diversity, all the systems of philosophy agree in 
one essential point. This pertains not only to the aim and means of 
the systems, but also their results. No matter what principles they 
begin from, or how they seek the reason for the world, they all arrive 
at a point where thinking ceases. They thrust themselves onto a very 
general something, be it of an intellectual or material nature. They 
then explain this something as not subject to further research and 
thus as the causa prima or innermost essence of the world. (Ibid.)
One problem with such first principles is that they do not stop regresses 
of questioning, a point that is complete only when we consider the second 
of Liebmann’s deductions (ibid., 31). In this, he analyzes philosophical 
systems as extensions of mundane questions and answers, questions 
that arise through the ubiquitous categories of substance and causal-
ity—Liebmann thereby uses a basic Kantian doctrine to formulate 
a metaphilosophical position that we could call his continuity thesis. 
According to this view, the questions we ask about everyday objects 
reduce to two: “What is it?” and “From whence comes it?” Since these 
are applications of a priori categories (substance and causality), they 
apply without exception to any object of human cognition. It is thus 
possible to inquire further into any concept or explanation that any 
human being offers, so no first principle in philosophy is permissible. 
The metaphysician is guilty of something akin to what Rorty much later 
called “stopping the conversation.”
 The continuity thesis demands that philosophical explanations re-
main of a piece with everyday explanations. In each case, we proceed 
according to the a priori categories of substance and causality. As a result, 
no worries could arise that we have appealed to principles to which the 
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categories would not apply—to do so (by asserting a first principle) would 
be precisely to lapse into dogmatism. The apriority of the categories, in 
other words, implies the impossibility of foundationalist metaphysics. 
To this extent, Liebmann argues against systematicity by appeal only 
to the status of the categories, which is exactly the move required by 
the programmatic arguments of Fischer and Zeller. To stop a regress of 
questions, we would have to transcend the conditions of experience.
 By completing Fischer’s argument from the concept of criticism 
(now better defined as a Neo-Kantian epistemology) to the rejection 
of systematicity (now better defined as foundational epistemology or 
metaphysics), Liebmann achieved precisely what all the misconceived 
histories could only fail to do. Criticism, on this account, arrives at a 
simple and antisystematic point: the answer to every question begs an 
additional question. To give a final answer, or to philosophize from a 
first principle, would imply that we can place a limit on the categories 
of substance and causality. In that case, we would cognize something 
that is not subject to those categories. This is dogmatism, and, with 
these arguments, Liebmann offered a redistribution of the Kantian 
triad dogmatist-skeptic-critic. A dogmatist is anyone who offers a first 
principle. A skeptic is someone who insists that there are no first prin-
ciples, where his sibling the critic corrects the skeptic only with a more 
nuanced dismissal. The critic explains that we misunderstand the nature 
of questions when we imagine that any question could be definitively 
answered. Questions lead rather to more questions, a point that should 
not bring reasoning humans to any despair. An amusing analogy illus-
trates these three options by depicting a child who sees a rainbow:
The historical development of philosophy reproduces again and again 
the same error, which is comparable to the despair of a young child 
who is unable to traverse the rainbow. As Jacobi rightly observed, it 
appears that “the truth retreats rather than confronts humanity.” 
Certain people called “skeptics” occasionally arise, who attempt to 
infuse reason into the situation by insisting that we will never get 
to the truth. This is like telling the kid that the rainbow is too far. 
The child will indeed capitulate, but unconvinced that his initial 
goal was unachievable. He can only become convinced of that when a 
wiser individual teaches him that the phenomenon in question [bunte 
Phaenomen] is not a consistent thing, not an actual bow attached to 
the sky, but rather a reflection of the sunlight in the raindrops. Since 
the rainbow is just a reflection, there is good reason that it must 
always retreat upon our approach. . . . [T]his (wiser individual) was 
Immanuel Kant. (Kant und die Epigonen, 34–35)
 The concept of criticism qua epistemology that Liebmann developed 
in these chapters thus led simultaneously to a rejection of systematic-
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ity, metaphysics, and foundationalism. These alternatives are seen to 
stem from a simple decision to end the regress of “why” questions, and 
it is the job of an epistemologist to prevent any efforts to so complete 
the inquiry. There is not to be any last answer, and the attempt to do 
so is as metaphysical as it is foundationalist: philosophers throughout 
the ages have sought to name the last explanans of inquiry, and Hegel’s 
absolute or Fichte’s Ich is, in this regard, no different from Spinoza’s 
substance or Thales’s water.
KANTIANISM CONTRA KANT
The contentious point of Liebmann’s argument is that it attacks 
systematicity only by eliminating the distinction between things and 
appearances, whereas Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had developed their 
systems through a similar move. Defenders of Post-Kantianism could 
easily claim that their tradition appealed to no metaphysical postulate, 
but rather began also with a rejection of the Kantian Ding an sich. It 
remained for Liebmann, then, to show that the Post-Kantian banish-
ment of the Ding an sich was unsuccessful. The major strategy is to 
show that, in rejecting Kant’s position, these philosophers, nonetheless, 
appropriated “another species of the genus ‘thing-in-itself ’” (Kant und 
die Epigonen, 85). The fallacy of the thing-in-itself is, again, a meth-
odological one: it concerns the order and type of explanation rather 
than the ontological status of the explanans. Every systemic, orga-
nizing first principle (Thales’ water, Spinoza’s substance, Schelling’s 
identity, Hegel’s absolute, and so forth) presents a particular species 
of thing-in-itself, as Liebmann understands the problem, since each 
presents an instance of the relevant explanatory error. It is vital to 
this strategy that the historical Kant also succumbed (after 1787) to 
systematicity, with the result that the rejection of the historical Kant 
was central to the rejection of foundationalism. Kant committed the 
great methodological mistake by appealing to a thing-in-itself, since 
the latter does not allow of further explanation in terms of the ques-
tions “what” and “whence.”
 In this section, I wish to examine how the continuity thesis—the claim 
that philosophical questions are extensions of mundane ones—enabled a 
rejection of a second Post-Kantian problem. Liebmann and his ilk were 
as much concerned, namely, with rejecting elaborate theories of subjec-
tivity as they were with the methodological arguments discussed in the 
previous section. Rejecting Fichtean/Hegelian theories of the subject 
enabled them to portray philosophy, as above, as more consistent not 
only with psychology but also with the supposedly “critical” strictures 
on knowledge.s__
n__
ksd
HPQ 32_1 text.indd   70 11/4/14   11:08 AM
 EPISTEMOLOGY IN EARLY NEO-KANTIANISM 71
 Liebmann staged his attack on Post-Kantian theories of subjectivity 
by appropriating another piece of popular historiography, in this case 
providing a careful analysis of Gottlob Ernst Schulze’s 1792 skepti-
cal tract Aenesidemus.33 Schulze published this text anonymously as 
a defense of a Humean skepticism against the philosophies of Kant 
and Reinhold. According to standard picture of Post-Kantianism, this 
somewhat successful criticism of Kant and Reinhold enabled Fichte to 
develop a more consistent idealist position.34 This picture serves as an 
early chapter of the history of modern philosophy that leads to Hegel 
and that was defended by Hegel’s followers in the years after his death. 
Liebmann’s argument proposes an ironic reversal of this narrative: in-
stead of providing Fichte with a clue to overcoming the philosophies of 
Kant and Reinhold in a move toward systematicity, Aenesidemus rather 
makes precisely this move impossible. The author thereby sides with 
Schulze/Aenesidemus against the historical Kant, with the rider that 
the skeptical arguments never applied to an appropriately minimalized 
Neo-Kantian Kant. The “Return to Kant,” thus, has this historical oddity 
to it: to excise the metaphysicians from Kantianism, Liebmann had to 
accept those very (Humean and skeptical) criticisms of Kant to which 
Fichte had responded. The Kant of this period was thus not only Neo-
Kantian but was even in a very important historical sense anti-Kantian.
 Especially convenient for Liebmann was the fact that Schulze 
treated the idea of a subjective derivation of the categories (Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s mistake) as equivalent to an objective derivation (the 
historical Kant’s mistake). The early chapters of Aenesidemus would 
come to play an increasingly central role in subsequent portrayals of the 
history of Kantianism, mainly because of this focus on the justification of 
the categories.35 Schulze, it turned out, had provided a defense of Hume 
that prepared Liebmann’s subsequent criticisms of Fichte, making the 
exact same arguments about the contradictory nature of the Critique 
of Pure Reason as Kant wrote it.
 Schulze/Aenesidemus had argued (and Liebmann accepted) that 
Kant’s strength lay in his concession to Hume that categories like 
causality cannot be derived from experience. On the other hand, Kant 
nonetheless attempted a derivation of such concepts. Schulze’s appli-
cation of this point, in the passages in question, concerns a purported 
derivation of the categories from the subject rather than from an object. 
This last point makes little difference to either Schulze or Liebmann, 
with the exception that it highlights the analogy between “thing-in-itself” 
and “absolute ego.” Kant’s premise, on Schulze’s account, was “in order 
to be thought as possible at all, these judgments must be thought as 
present a priori and derived from the mind” (Aenesidemus, 107; 1792 __s
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ed., 142). Given such an understanding of Kant, Schulze reasonably 
complained that
a derivation of the necessity and universality in knowledge by ap-
peal to our minds [aus dem Gemuethe] does not make the existence 
of that necessity one bit more intelligible, than does a derivation (of 
the necessity and universality of our knowledge) by appeal to external 
objects and their influence. (ibid., 110; 1792 ed., 145)
Liebmann’s reply concedes to Schulze the entire substantive debate. For 
more than a decade, Kant scholars had grappled precisely with this kind 
of inner contradiction in the critical philosophy, which was much easier 
to accept in 1865 than it had been in 1792. After all, the fact that Kant 
reverted to dogmatism was a premise not only of Liebmann’s analysis 
but of the entire philological tradition that followed Schopenhauer and 
Fischer. Nonetheless, Liebmann differs from Schulze on one crucial point, 
which results in his deflecting Schulze’s criticism away from Kant and 
onto Fichte. The issue concerns what is meant by “a priori,” and Lieb-
mann fairly objected to Schulze’s interpretation of this: “Aenesidemus 
is constantly under the mistaken impression that ‘to be given a priori’ 
means the same as ‘to be produced by the mind’” (Kant und die Epigonen, 
47). Liebmann’s own understanding of a priori is simpler. He takes this 
expression to mean only “not subject to further derivation.” If this was 
also Kant’s meaning—and Liebmann thinks that we can at least revise 
Kant to mean this—then Schulze’s arguments would no longer apply to 
(the properly minimalized Neo-Kantian) Kant.
 The many versions of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and by extension 
the German Idealist movement that was believed to have culminated 
in Hegel’s school, elaborate two additional points that fall prey to 
Liebmann’s argument, which combine to complete the agenda of Fischer 
and Zeller. Liebmann needed, namely, not only to argue from criticism 
to the impossibility of a system but also to secure the relationship of 
philosophy to psychology and the other sciences. The first Fichtean 
obstacle to this point lay in the identity of the human subject, which 
was put into an uneasy predicament by Fichte. Since the so-called Ich 
an sich—for obvious reasons Liebmann’s preferred expression—is not 
subject to analysis by categories, it is not something that the empirical 
ego can recognize as identical with itself. Fichte’s argumentation rather 
leaves an irreconcilable gap between the empirical and absolute egos. 
The latter functions “without our knowing it,” and its constructions are 
such that we necessarily form no concept or representation of them and 
their occurrence. The absolute ego “stands behind the curtains directing 
the colorful puppet-show of existence with the invisible strings of its 
absolute activity” (Kant und die Epigonen, 82). Since this whole process 
is something of which we are apparently unaware, the suggestion that 
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there is such a thing leads to interminable and insoluble difficulties such 
as this problem of the divided self. Liebmann’s argument here served to 
eliminate the metaphysics of the subject that had interested German 
philosophers prior to 1860 and, in so doing, to correct the relationship 
between philosophy and psychology.
 The irreconcilability of the egos thus coincides with the second 
problem, namely, the relationship between philosophy and other inter-
rogative endeavors. Fichte took subjectivism beyond the boundaries 
set by Kant, as the latter was reconstructed by these writers. Like 
other early modern epistemologists, Kant accepted that the contents 
of our experiences (colors, sounds, and such) run through some sort of 
subjective filters. The mere fact that we are conscious of objects at all, 
however, is not something that we recognize as a result of our own ac-
tivity. Criticism places certain conditions on the contents of experience 
and was never intended (as Fichte imagined) as an explanation of the 
fact that we have conscious experience in the first place. Acknowledging 
this, Fichte made concessions to “everyday consciousness,” to which the 
fact of experience and the laws of logic appear to be the work of “cor-
responding objects that appear without our contribution” (Liebmann, 
Kant und die Epigonen, 80). Fichte was, thus, incapable of portraying 
philosophy as continuous with common experience in a manner akin to 
what Liebmann achieved when he defined philosophy in terms of mun-
dane applications of substance (what?) and causality (whence?). Fichte 
rather had to insist that philosophical cognition was of a different nature 
and order than the types of cognition warranted by the categories. This 
point brings Fischer’s agenda full circle, since Liebmann argued from 
a minimalized criticism (the apriority of the categories) to the impos-
sibility of a system and then from the latter point to a modest relation 
between philosophy cum epistemology and other scientific endeavors. 
In the process, he secured a straightforward methodological argument 
that accepted the most common objections to the historical Kant, leav-
ing no room for ideas such as transcendental subjectivity, intellectual 
intuition, the thing-appearance distinction, and so on.
CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that early Neo-Kantians defended the priority of episte-
mology on principally antifoundational grounds, in a manner that was 
overlooked by Rorty’s polemic against both epistemology and founda-
tionalism. It turns out that “epistemology” or Erkenntnislehre, in the 
earliest coherent defenses of this endeavor, was essentially antifounda-
tional. The argumentative means with which Liebmann attacked the 
systematic philosophers, what I have labeled the correlation argument, 
in fact resembles an argument closer to Rorty’s own agenda. The latter 
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was fond of citing Sellars’s claim that terms like “object” and “subject” 
have correlative meanings, so that there could not be one thing without 
the other. In a manner similar to Rorty, Liebmann concludes that this 
point implies the impossibility of ending the series of justifications with 
appeal to a final category. My argument, however, shows that these 
points represent the historical beginnings of “epistemology,” and so not, 
as Rorty wished, its end.
 Nonetheless, an important lesson is to be taken from Rorty’s Philoso-
phy and the Mirror of Nature, one that concerns our entire conception of 
the history of philosophy: the lesson, namely, that our history has been 
constructed over time by a range of working historians, many of whom 
plainly composed their narratives to accord with programmatic argu-
ments and other philosophical agendas. A contemporary historian should 
not adopt old narratives without such detailed investigations into the 
underlying principles that motivated them. The Kant who synthesized 
rationalism and empiricism, for instance, is perhaps a holdover of such 
aborted philological debates as I have reviewed here. Rorty’s failure was 
thus not, as he sometimes retrospectively feared, that he relied too much 
on intellectual history, but rather that he did not conduct it thoroughly 
enough.36
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